INTRODUCTION
Life expectancy in western societies is increasing. A man of pensionable age living in an OECD country is expected to live, on average, a further 18.5 years -compared to 16.2 years 20 years ago (OECD 2011) . With increasing life expectancy people spend more time in retirement, provided the retirement age remains unchanged. As ageing populations challenge the sustainability of the pension system, an increase in the retirement age seems to be an inevitable reform alternative (OECD 2011 ). This step is however frequently met with great resistance. In this chapter I examine if and how attitudes towards increasing the retirement age have changed in recent years. Is the opposition to reform crumbling with rising reform pressures? And what are the effects of a reform that changes the legal retirement age? Moreover, do groups within societies react to these developments differently, and do we thus find increasing conflicts, for example between social classes? Or can we perhaps observe the emergence of new conflict lines, for example between the old and the young?
This chapter contributes to two key aspects of the general framework of this book. First, an analysis of aggregate public opinion on the country level is combined with an examination of how specific groups of individuals react to particular policy reforms. Second, I aim to complement the rather static findings of previous attitudinal research focusing on cross-country comparisons at a single point in time (Boeri et al. 2002; Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2013 for studies on pension attitudes) or on changes over time in single-country studies (Litwin et al. 2009 ) with a more dynamic analysis of reform preferences over time and across different institutional settings in order to infer whether and to what extent welfare state reforms influence citizens' attitudes.
Using data from 25 European countries between 2004 and 2009 I provide an indepth examination of the dynamics at both the country and the individual levels regarding attitudes towards increasing the retirement age. Using multilevel analysis I am able to link the macro-and micro-levels of explanation. Since some countries increased their legal retirement age during this period it is possible to assess the causal effect of reforms on attitudes using a quasi-experimental design (difference-indifferences). Due to data availability -repeated cross-sectional data and not panel data on the individual level -this strict test of causality will only be possible for the aggregate level.
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin with a discussion of the main theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between national-level pressures and policies and how they affect attitudes towards increasing the retirement age. Before presenting data, methods and results I provide a short summary of recent pension policy trends across Europe.
THEORY AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS

The Interrelationship between Policy and Public Opinion Over Time
The question of how public opinion and policies are linked is now a prominent and widely researched topic in the social sciences. Theoretical and empirical research support the claim that it is, in fact, an interrelationship: opinion affects policy (Brooks and Manza 2006; Page and Shapiro 1983) and policy affects opinion (Burstein 2003; Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993) . In this chapter I am interested in the policyopinion nexus -how feedback processes of policies impact opinion. How do people adapt their preferences (e.g. in terms of retirement age) to a policy change (e.g. a reform raising the retirement age)?
Theoretically, absolute and relative preferences have to be distinguished from one another. Absolute preferences refer to the optimal level of policy, e.g. which exact retirement age people prefer. It is questionable whether people indeed have these absolute preferences, since policy is often far too complex for individuals to prefer a specific policy level independent of the current policy. Relative preferences, however, capture individual policy opinions much more reliably, as people are better able to state their preferred level of policy in comparison to the current policy. In line with previous research (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2009 ) I therefore refer to relative preferences if not otherwise stated.
Two explanations for the policy-opinion link exist in the literature. Proponents of a negative feedback claim that 'in effect, the public would behave like a thermostat; when the actual policy "temperature" differs from the preferred policy temperature, the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly, and once sufficiently adjusted, the signal would stop' (Wlezien 1995, p. 981) . Thus, an increase of the retirement age decreases the preference for further increasing the retirement age as the demand for a higher retirement age is satisfied to some extent by the policy change. Soroka and Wlezien (2009) In contrast, policy may feed back positively on preferences (Baumgartner and Jones 2002) . According to this argument an increase of the retirement age will result in an increased preference for further raising the retirement age. Two explanations support this argument. The first is concerned with the positive consequences of a policy change:
If people experience positive consequences from a policy change they may want to have 'more of the same', assuming that further policy changes in the same direction will have further positive effects. The second explanation for positive feedback effects claims that people adjust their absolute preferences in reaction to a policy change. Under the assumption that 'policies, once established, act as institutions, because they create a framework in which certain resources, rules and norms are imposed upon citizens' (Lowi 1964, p. 644) , this argument is consistent with institutional theory. While institutions do not directly affect the strategic calculus of actors, they do shape basic preferences and the very identity of individuals (Hall and Taylor 1996) .
In line with these arguments, Raven et al. (2011) that the reform increased awareness of the untenability of the pension system. Reducing public benefits led to an increasing acceptance of lower taxes and reduced benefits.
They conclude that 'the Riester reform seems to have backfired' (Boeri et al. 2002) .
Following the positive policy feedback argument I propose the following alternative hypothesis.
H 2: Alignment hypothesis
In countries where the retirement age has been raised, the preference to further raise the retirement age increases. Countries with a high retirement age will show high levels of acceptance for further increases of the retirement age.
Policy Effects on Group Differences in Attitudes
Even if the overall level of acceptance has not changed, the pattern of attitudes may have nevertheless changed. For example, some groups in society might increase their acceptance of increasing the retirement age, whereas others may oppose such a reform even more strongly. Therefore, my focus now turns to the pattern of attitudes and where conflicts are located within societies, and whether policy changes affect these group differences in attitudes. As already mentioned, the available data on the individual level do not allow a strict causal test of the effects of raising the retirement age for different groups. Therefore the 'era of permanent austerity', culminating in the 2008 global financial crises, serves as the background against which changes in the attitude structure are examined. The emergence and expansion of the welfare state is generally understood as a struggle or negotiation between social groups with differing interests.
This struggle takes place in and is thus shaped by the inequality and opportunity structure of a respective society (Esping-Andersen 1990 Boeri et al. 2002) find no significant effect of political ideology.
H 3: Old cleavages hypothesis
The preference to increase the retirement age should be structured along class and left/right ideological lines.
Several general trends in the development of modern societies are often said to contribute to declining class cleavages (Clark and Lipset 2001): for example, the development towards a risk society (Beck 1992) , individualization trends and the transition to a postmaterialist, postmodern or postindustrial society (Inglehart 1990 ).
First risk society (Beck 1992 ) and individualization-hypotheses claim that the issues social policies address, such as unemployment, lack of health care or poverty in old age, are understood as individual risks, and protection against them is a matter of individual responsibility, not the responsibility of social groups or governments. These changes are likely to create a society where class loses its saliency as a base for identities and interests. Second, the basic idea behind post-materialism (Inglehart 1990 ) is that the traditional motivations of material and social security have lost their effects on behaviour and attitudes. Traditional hierarchies are declining and stratification based class has become fragmented. As with the conclusions reached for the risk society, class cleavages are declining in importance.
H 4: End of class politics hypothesis
The association between class and preferences to increase the retirement age will decline over time, resulting in minor or no class differences in the pattern of preferences.
The 'new politics of the welfare state' literature (Pierson 2001) analyses welfare state change against a backdrop of increasing pressures and austerity, and assumes attitudes to depend on the interests of groups benefitting from certain social policy programmes.
It is claimed that interest formation in times of welfare state retrenchment follows a quite different logic compared to times of welfare state expansion. As long as the welfare state was expanding, reforms basically aimed at redistributing additional benefits. Even if benefits were not distributed equally and interests were conflicted, this conflict is assumed to be less pronounced, as people usually agree with a reform if they benefit in some way. In contrast, in times of austerity reform is about retrenchment or at least recalibrating the welfare state. Opposition to such reforms is assumed to be much stronger. Conflict lines should run between groups who benefit from the welfare state, thus defending 'their' programmes, and the net payers who are more inclined to accept reforms and cutbacks. Conflict (and opposition to reform) might be even more severe if additional benefits for some groups or social policy programmes are only possible at the cost of other groups or social policy programmes.
In terms of ageing societies, the emerging conflicts between generations have not only gained attention in the media but also among scholars, and are often assumed to comprise the most important new cleavage in the field of pension policy. Current pensioners are expected to favour an increase of the retirement age since this stabilizes the level of current and future pension payments without any costs for the retirees.
Among the working population, younger employees are expected to be more supportive than older employees. Younger employees have a higher life expectancy, thereby reducing the relative costs of working longer. They would benefit more from a stabilization of contribution rates, as they still have more contribution years to pay. In line with these expectations, previous research frequently finds a U-shaped relationship, with younger and older respondents favouring an increase of the retirement age and middle-aged workers opposing it (Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2013) .
Gender is another new cleavage. Women are expected to support the welfare state more than men since they are more likely to rely on the welfare state as widows or single parents. They are also more likely to be employed by the welfare state. Existing differences in the life expectancy and the legal retirement ages between men and women possibly add to this conflict. Moreover, as recent reforms of the retirement age have tended to align women's with men's legal retirement age, women are more affected by reforms (Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2013; Velladics et al. 2006 ).
Furthermore, three arguments suggest that an increase of the retirement age is more acceptable for higher educated people. First, they usually have a better capability to work longer, as their jobs are less physically demanding. Second, the marginal utility of additional contribution years is possibly higher for the better educated, as they started to work later in their lives and have not yet paid in as many years as the less educated.
Third, higher educated people tend to be better informed about the effects of the demographic change and should thus have a greater awareness of the reform pressures (Boeri et al. 2002) .
H 5: New cleavages hypothesis
New group differences in the preference to increase the retirement age based on narrow self-interest will emerge or (if already there) increase.
PENSION SYSTEMS UNDER PRESSURE: PENSION POLICY TRENDS ACROSS EUROPE
This chapter analyses changes of reform preferences against the backdrop of increasing reform pressures, continued restructuring and retrenchment. The following summary of social and economic trends related to the pension system and how governments reacted to these changes should locate the time period examined in this chapter within the general socio-economic development over the last 25 years. • Providing more funded schemes or greater reliance on funded schemes.
• Promoting private schemes.
• Reducing benefits.
• Promoting longer employment.
• Raising the retirement age and closing the gap in retirement age between men and women.
These measures are partly reflected in the institutional characteristics of the 25 EU countries included in this analysis. The promotion of private schemes possibly led to a slight decrease from 90.1 per cent to 89.8 per cent in terms of the public share of total expenditures on old age, survivor and incapacity benefits. As the replacement rate remained stable, efforts to reduce benefits did not show any consequences at the EU level. The promotion of longer employment is reflected in an increase of the average effective retirement age. Of specific interest for this study is the last policy measure suggested by Soede and Vrooman (2008) The preference for increasing the retirement age is measured by the following item:
If you had to choose from the following possibilities aimed at guaranteeing the financing of the pension system in (OUR COUNTRY), which one would be most acceptable for you? 3 Responses included 'Work and contribute for longer', 'Maintain the retirement age and increase your social security contributions' and 'Maintain the current retirement age and accept that you will receive less'. Some respondents answered spontaneously 'None of these' or 'A combination of all three'. These answers were recorded separately.
Compared to measuring preferences using open questions (e.g. EB56.1: 'Do you agree that the age of retirement should be raised so that people work longer and therefore spend less time in retirement?'), the question used here has the advantage that it poses a realistic trade-off between specific policy options. As my main interest in this study is the attitude towards an increase in the retirement age, I recoded answers into a dummy variable. Respondents who answered that it would be most acceptable to work and contribute for longer are assumed to favour an increase in retirement age over the other alternatives. All other respondents favour other policy alternatives and are assumed to oppose an increase in the retirement age.
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Independent Variables at the Country Level
Until recently the standard approach to explaining country differences in welfare attitudes has been to draw on Esping-Andersen's (1990) regime types (e.g. Arts and clerks, government officials), from small employers and the self-employed, and from the working class (e.g. care workers, tool makers, cleaners). The unemployed, pensioners and disabled were assigned the class score that referred to their last occupation; respondents who have never worked are added as an additional category.
People's political orientation was operationalized by their self-placement on a ten point left-right scale. Answers were collapsed into three categories: Left (1-4), right (7-10) and centre (5,6) as the reference category.
As proxies representing different degrees of self-interest age, age squared, gender and education are taken as the most important new cleavages. A respondent's education is assessed using the age at which he or she exited full-time education, distinguishing between primary or no education, secondary education and tertiary education. Family status (whether married or not) and household size are included as additional controls.
RESULTS
The Feedback Effect of Raising the Retirement Age
I start with a descriptive analysis of the trends over time. Figure 11 .1 provides a graphical illustration of country differences after controlling for compositional effects. is exactly to gain some insights into the direction of causality. Therefore, I focus on one reform alternative and examine more specifically how a policy change increasing the retirement age affects the acceptance to work and contribute longer. of other important institutional characteristics of the pension system and for period effects, I can rule out that these characteristics or the general time trend account for the effect. 8 Thus, with regard to the direct short-term effects of a pension reform, the saturation hypothesis is confirmed. After the legal retirement age has been raised, acceptance of a further increase drops.
In this analysis I take the year of the legislation as the time of a reform, thereby assuming that this is the more relevant stage in the reform process where we should expect to observe feedback effects. There is usually a general discussion preceding or following the legislation; people are thus aware of the reform and possibly even know which party is accountable for the reform. Nevertheless, since most reforms postpone their implementation by up to 20 years (Table 11 .1), the effect of a reform might be larger if it is in place and 'felt' by citizens (cf. Lindbom's findings on the difference between retrenchment proposals and binding decisions, Chapter 8 in this volume). As
Lindbom's main argument refers to the transparency of reforms I would still argue that in the case of reforms, increasing the retirement age the time of implementation is much less transparent to the wider public than the time of legislation, as only a very small share of people is actually affected, that is, the cohort retiring in this year. Moreover, at the implementation stage a potential feedback effect can be assumed to be comparably small since the retirement age usually changes gradually, increasing the retirement age step-wise by, for example, two months per year.
The Stability of Old and New Cleavages
The aggregate level of acceptance and the structure of individual attitudes within a country are independent of each other. While the overall level of acceptance might increase, the structure of attitudes remains unchanged if all individuals or social groups increase their acceptance in parallel. The focus now turns to the pattern of attitudes and the question where conflicts are located within societies and how they develop over time. As the unit of analysis changes from the country to the individual, I rely on crosssectional data at four points in time rather than time-series data. I am therefore unable to provide a strict test of the causal effect of a reform on individual attitudes. As an alternative the development of mounting reform pressures, retrenchment and restructuring outlined above is taken as a background against which changes in the attitude structures are examined.
In order to test the hypothesis on whether the impact of social class has In line with the theoretical expectations I find significant differences between the social classes (Table 11. 3). 9 The odds for a member of the highest social class to accept working and contributing longer is 1.29 times higher than the odds for a member of the working classes (in 2004) . With regard to political ideology, people with a right political ideology are more in favour of an increase in the retirement age, whereas people with a left political ideology tend to oppose such a reform. Consistent with previous studies on class and welfare attitudes (Naumann forthcoming; Svallfors 2006) these old cleavages do not lose their significance and only slightly decrease in magnitude after the inclusion of the new cleavages. In no year do we see any evidence for the hypothesis that new cleavages are supplanting old cleavages. As both seem to be important determinants of the attitude structure, I will now turn to the full models with both old and new cleavages.
Most of the differences are in the expected direction and are rather stable over time (Table 11. 3). As mentioned above, the upper social classes and people with a right political ideology have the highest acceptance of increasing the retirement age. As for the new cleavages, age, gender and education, I observe a rather stable U-shaped age effect: The youngest and the oldest favour an increase of the retirement age, whereas the working-age population (25 to 64) opposes an increase in the retirement age. There is a strong and significant gender effect, with men being more supportive of an increase of the retirement age than women. Moreover, raising the retirement age is more acceptable to those with tertiary education than for those with secondary or primary education.
This might be the result of their awareness of the reform pressures, but can perhaps be traced back to a greater capability to work longer. Both reasons make this reform alternative more attractive for the more educated. Not surprisingly the direction of differences did not change over time -in all four years groups differ in their attitudes in the expected way. In a final step I now examine whether the strength of group differences has changed over time (Figure 11 .2). I calculated net differences for the most relevant old and new cleavages in order to measure the intensity of conflict (Svallfors 2008) . abandoning their reluctance to increase the retirement age. Public opinion might not always be the assumed major obstacle to welfare state retrenchment. Reforming the legal retirement age, however, changes preferences in the following year: Increasing the retirement age leads to a significant drop in acceptance of further raising the retirement age, thus supporting the saturation hypothesis. At first glance, the alignment hypothesis has to be rejected, as attitudes are neither in line with countries' institutional characteristics nor do they adapt to changes of the legal retirement age. However, the results of this study are clearly restricted to short-term effects, as the data only covers a very brief period of time. Previous research has shown that while alignment of attitudes to institutions exists, it works slowly, as it is mainly driven by generational replacement (Svallfors 2010) . Taking different time horizons into account, both the saturation and the alignment hypotheses may be true. As shown in this chapter people change their attitudes against the reform direction in the short-run. In the long-run, however, this effect might be counterbalanced if people experience positive effects of a reform and adapt their absolute preferences to the new status quo. How a reform will affect attitudes in the long-run remains an open question -but also one which is possibly very challenging to answer.
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As for the pattern of attitudes within a country it is stability, and not change, that is observed. While both old and new cleavages are important determinants of the attitude structure, reforms do not affect these cleavage patterns since all groups within society (e.g. social classes or age groups) seem to move and adapt their attitudes in parallel over time. Nevertheless, there is some indication that gender differences have slightly increased in magnitude, possibly as a result of reforms aligning women's retirement ages to men's. Even such small and insignificant changes, when observed yearly, might add up over time and result in changed attitude patterns. Linking these conflict lines to the political opportunity structure of subsequent reforms, e.g. 'new' conflict lines cross-cutting 'old' political and/or class cleavages might create new possibilities for coalitions, would complete the circle, thereby going back to the determinants of policies and reflecting the idea of a dynamic policy process.
